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Abstract 
 
In this study I analyze the impact of currency shocks on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR) resulted from cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) around the announcement day. 
Cross-border M&As represent almost one third of the deals. As there is not much information about it, 
this makes this analysis relevant. Furthermore, the scarce of information increases when we talk the 
ways that currency movements affect this kind of deals.  
Throughout this study, I analyze three different samples, with acquirers from Eurozone, United 
Kingdom and United States of America, each of them in relation to the rest of the world to see how the 
CARs are affected by currency shocks, which might or not, create incentives to pursue cross-border 
deals under depreciation effects. 
I believe that companies only would follow a cross-border deal under depreciation shocks, only 
if, they believe that those currency changes are temporary. They must be aware that a depreciation in 
the target’s currency decreases the cost of the deal, but it also reduces the revenues when converted 
to the local currency.  
To make this analysis, I rely on three clean samples with 1204 deals for the Eurozone sample, 
763 deals for the UK sample and 2126 for the US sample, all the deals occur between 2009 and 
2018.  Attending the main target’s currencies, I find that Brazilian real and Australian dollar are 
currencies that depreciate more frequently in relation to Euro and the US dollar. On the UK side, the 
currencies that depreciate more frequently in relation to the pound are the Australian and the Canadian 
dollar. 
Despite I do not find many significant variables related to currency depreciations, the ones that 
I find when isolated from other variables reveal positive effects on the CARs.  In the hypothesis 1a) and 
1b) the Eurozone sample reveals a positive impact of 1.84 percentage points for the CAR(-2,+2) and 
0.677 percentage points for the CAR(-1,+1), respectively, when the deal occurs 4 quarters after a 
currency shock.  Moving to hypothesis 2b) the UK sample reveals a positive impact of 4.23,4.57 and 
5.35 percentage points for CAR(-1,+1), CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5), when there were at least 2 
currency shocks in 4 quarters before the deal.  
 
V 
 
 
Keywords: cross-border M&As, Cumulative Abnormal Returns, currency shocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI 
 
 
Resumo 
 Neste estudo vou analisar o impacto de choques cambiais nos Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR), resultantes de fusões e aquisições internacionais, na altura do anúncio do negócio. Este tipo 
de negócios representa quase um terço do número total de fusões e aquisições. Esta análise torna-se 
relevante, porque apesar de haver muitos estudos para fusões e aquisições, não há muitos que 
abordem fusões e aquisições internacionais. Essa escassez aumenta quando falamos de efeitos de 
câmbio em fusões e aquisições. 
 Ao longo deste trabalho, vamos analisar 3 amostras diferentes, cada uma delas com 
adquirentes da Zona Euro, do Reino Unido e dos Estados Unidos da América, em relação ao resto do 
mundo, para ser possível analisar como reagem à volatilidade das taxas de câmbio, o que poderá criar 
incentivos a seguir uma fusão ou aquisição internacional. 
 Acredito que as empresas apenas sigam um negócio deste tipo quando houver efeitos de 
câmbio, apenas se acreditarem que as mudanças cambiais são temporárias. Por um lado, a 
depreciação da moeda da empresa alvo decresce o custo do negócio, mas por outro, também reduz 
as receitas, quando convertidas para a moeda do adquirente. 
 Para realizar este estudo, vou analisar três amostras com 1204 negócios para a amostra da 
zona Euro, 763 para a amostra do Reino Unido e 2126 para a amostra dos Estados Unidos. Todos os 
negócios estão compreendidos entre o período temporal 2009 a 2018. Atendendo às moedas dos 
principais alvos dos adquirentes, o real do Brasil e o dólar australiano são as moedas que se depreciam 
mais frequentemente em relação ao euro e ao dólar americano. Do lado do Reino Unido, as moedas 
que se depreciam mais frequentemente em relação à libra são o dólar australiano e canadiano. 
Apesar de não ter encontrado muitas variáveis significativas relacionadas com o câmbio da 
moeda, as que encontrei e isoladas de outras variáveis, revelam efeitos positivos nos CARs. Na 
hipótese 1a) e 1b) a amostra da zona Euro revela um impacto positivo de 1.84 pontos percentuais 
para o CAR(-2,+2) e 0.677 pontos percentuais para o CAR(-1,+1), respetivamente, quando o negócio 
ocorre nos 4 trimestres depois de um choque cambial. Na hipótese 2b) a amostra do Reino Unido 
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revela um impacto positivo de 4.23, 4.57 e 5.35 pontos percentuais para o CAR(-1,+1), CAR(-2,+2) e 
CAR(-5,+5), quando houveram pelo menos 2 choques cambiais nos 4 trimestres antes do negócio.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this study I analyze if currency shocks have a considerable impact on the bidder’s 
announcement returns when the target’s currency suffers a depreciation. The purpose is to study if 
the acquirer sees a depreciation as an opportunity to buy a given company cheaper than usual. As that 
event could also reduce revenues when converted to acquirer’s currency, the bidder would take 
advantage of it if it believes that shock is temporary. If it is, the deal price would be smaller, and 
revenues would not be affected that much. It is important to study cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions due to its large weight on the total of deals of this kind and the lack of information related 
to it.  
To do this work, I will rely on 3 samples: the first includes acquirers from eurozone countries, 
the second acquirers from the UK and the third acquirers from the US, all the samples do not include 
deals with targets that share the same currency, in order understand the impact of currency 
depreciations in relation to euro, pound and the US dollar. 
Regarding targets, it will be interesting studying if developing countries use depreciation to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to increase efficiency and productivity. The influence and power 
is changing at a fast  pace, still, developing economies will need years to converge and reach a position 
to take back some power and influence from the developed countries (Brakman & Marrewijk, 2008). 
It will be important to collect some literature about the general motivations of cross-border 
Mergers and Acquisitions to fully understand the phenomenon and select the better control variables 
to build the models. 
Globalization aligned to trade liberalization has helped to create a common area between 
countries, and as the time passes, they are even more linked, which make companies from different 
countries have more commercial relations (Grave, Vardiabasis & Yavas, 2012).  
M&A started evolving since the 90s, first on a domestic market, with companies through joining 
forces to increase productivity and efficiency by acquiring mainly homogenous firms (Grave et al., 
2012). The reduction of income levels and consequently consumption has motivated the US and 
Europe to expand their markets to Asia, Middle-East and South America (Grave et al., 2012). In 2000 
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a peak of M&A in relation to the previous years was observed and in 2003 a new peak was observed 
which had resulted in a constant growth from 2003 to 2007, on the other hand, a financial crisis was 
coming, with the failure of Lehman Brothers and other financial institutions keep trying to survive, 
lending hit the lowest levels, with that even domestic deals suffered a big drop (Grave et al., 2012). 
Based on Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) results, 96% of the transactions involve a private 
acquirer and 97% have either a private acquirer or target. The volume of cross-border acquisitions had 
increased substantially between 1998 to 2007, from 23% to 45% (Erel et al., 2012).  The exchange 
rate of the acquirer tends to appreciate and the country-level stock return of the acquirer’s stocks is 
higher in the 12, 24 and 36 months before the deal which results in a market-to-book ratio higher by 
9,93% when the deal occurs for the acquirer countries (Erel et al., 2012). 
There are some factors that could make a cross-border deal harder and costly, such as cultural 
and geographic differences. However, it could also have benefic effects, even for the acquired company 
if the acquirer’s country offers a better protection due higher governance standard. Acquisitions are 
more likely to happen if the distance between the target and acquirer is shorter, or if they already have 
a relationship or common cultural background. The chance of acquiring a relatively inexpensive 
company due to changes in exchange rates or market valuations in local currency could trigger the 
bidder’s interest (Erel et al., 2012). 
To sum up, in this study I analyze if target’s currency affects the acquirer’s gains and 
understand if that fact may be considered a crucial factor to pursue a cross-border deal. 
 This worked is divided in 7 sections: Section 2 provides information related to similar studies, 
in order to present an overlook on this subject. Section 3 presents the hypotheses to be tested. Section 
4 describes the methodology used, event study and regressions. In Section 5 I provide information 
about the collected data and some descriptive analysis. Section 6 shows regression tables and their 
analysis. Finally, section 7 concludes this dissertation. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 M&A Motivations 
 
Generally, mergers occur when it is estimated that the combined firm’s value is superior to 
the sum of the separate value of each firm. The main motivations are synergies (economies of 
scope/scale), market power, diversification, lower combined tax liabilities (Erel et al., 2012). 
According to Erel et al. (2012), concerning to the volume of cross-border transactions (in 1990 
dollars), it suffers some oscillations in the 90s and increased significantly from 1997, hitting a peak of 
approximately 33% in 2000, then suffers a decrease and starts increasing again between 2004 and 
2007, in 2007 reaches a percentage of 45% (Erel et al., 2012).  Acquirers tend to buy firms in nearby 
countries, for example about two thirds of New Zealand’s acquisitions were Australian companies; 
China was the main target of Hong Kong and the main target of Germany was from US and European 
companies. It’s important to study how these behaviors have changed since 2007, as there are not 
many studies available for this matter after 2007. 
 
2.2 Market Value and Currency Movements 
 
An important point to take into consideration is the market value of firm’s equity. Based on 
data from 1990 to 2007, companies from countries whose stock market appreciated and therewith 
have a higher-market-to-book value tend to be acquirers, while firms from struggle economies are more 
likely to become potential targets (Erel et al., 2012). 
By analyzing valuation differences using country-level data, stock and currency differences 
have a larger impact when the acquirer country is rich. Moreover, the effect of currency is higher when 
the distance between 2 countries is less than the sample median (Erel et al., 2012). 
Still regarding market valuation, if the acquiring company believes that differences in valuation 
are temporary, then there are some opportunities to explore and that could lead to higher expected 
profits, the acquirer will buy the target’s stocks when they worth less and expect the value to appreciate 
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afterwards. If a manager of a given company knows that the stocks are overvalued, probably, he/she 
will want to raise money by issuing new shares at inflated prices and then buy the stocks of an 
undervalued company or at least less overvalued (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). Cross-border M&As could 
still occur because of mispricing of securities due to irrational expectations and changes in risk 
aversion, and the target could accept the payment in a temporarily depreciated currency or overvalued 
stock (Baker, Foley, & Wurgler, 2009). Apparently, companies in richer countries purchase foreign 
firms after a drop in the poorer country’s stock market. 
Also, a permanent change in valuation could motivate cross-border deals because it leads a 
lower cost of capital, therewith a potential foreign acquirer could act more aggressively in pursuing 
domestic assets than domestically rival bidders (Froot & Stein, 1991). 
Overvaluation argument applies essentially to public companies that can issue new stock at 
the high valuation prices or it could be useful if the company buys the target using its overvalued stocks 
(Baker et al., 2009).   
The currency has also a considerable weight on mergers, even more, the closer the companies 
are from each other. Mergers are affected by changes in valuation that makes one of the parties 
economically fragile and then more attractive for the other party, and, for that reason currency may be 
seen as an influencing factor of cross-border M&As (Erel et al., 2012).  
The results suggest that cross-border mergers tend to happen in country pairs that are used 
to experience large currency movements, but in many situations, cross-border mergers tend to happen 
even without currency concerns (Erel et al., 2012). An analysis of two-way bilateral Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) has shown that the investment in foreign soil tends to happen when there is a strong 
presence of exchange rate volatility, and FDI between the US, the UK, Canada and Japan is stimulated 
in this scenario of volatility (Goldberg & Koistad, 1994). 
 An exchange rate movement might either increase or decrease the FDI, which involves firm-
specific assets, that can be accessed either by foreign or domestic companies at the same currency. 
However, they can generate cash flows in multiple currencies, this may explain why Japanese 
acquisitions are favorable when the real value of the US dollar depreciates, especially for targets that 
own firm-specific assets (Blonigen, 1997).  
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A currency depreciation leads to a lower cost for foreign acquiring firms, on the other hand, 
the conversion of the revenues for the foreign acquiring firm could offset the cost reduction of the 
merger or acquisition (Georgopoulos, 2008). However, following the idea of Shleifer and Vishny (2003), 
if the acquirer believes that depreciation is temporary, then we could think that despite we could convert 
revenues at a lower rate at first, after a while the conversion rate will increase, and the deal would be 
profitable.  
Another theory says that regarding the point above could happen, a foreign acquirer could take 
advantage of it, since the target may have a valuable innovation or a specific asset that does not involve 
foreign currency transactions and still generates returns in a diversity of markets and currencies at the 
same time (Guo & Trivedi, 2002). Other studies also support the idea that  cross border M&As could 
be driven not only by tangible assets, but also for intangible assets, such as, technology, brand names, 
specialized workforce, etc (Kang & Johansson, 2000). 
A study led by Georgopoulos (2008) suggests that depreciation leads to successful cross-
border M&As but only in high R&D intensive industries. This highlights the importance of R&D in this 
matter. 
Exchange rates changes affect costs of production overseas, which usually, is not followed by 
an increase in costs in the target market (wages, for example). If such movements are anticipated  they 
could be reflected in higher costs of financing for the project, as the risk is adjusted to rates of returns 
among countries – interest rate parity (Klein & Rosengren, 1996). 
Several empirical studies have found that a depreciation of the US dollar leads to an increase 
of FDI in the USA and to a higher takeover premium (Froot & Stein, 1991; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; 
Swenson, 1993).   
Probably, the most direct effect of a currency depreciation is regarded to relative wealth, since 
a depreciation in the target’s country increases the bidder’s relative wealth, lowering the relative cost 
of capital, which could motivate potential acquirers to invest more intensely in assets abroad.  
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2.3 Financial Crisis and its impact on M&A 
 
Financial crisis is another factor that can affect M&As, the crisis from 2008 to 2009 demanded 
struggling industries to consolidate in the economic downturn, and had effects on the global wealth 
distribution leading to shifting locations of potential growth; cross-border deals increased and were 
expanded to other areas such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (Grave et al., 2012). In a financial 
scenario, it is important to join forces to improve expansion, growth, and innovation to overcome 
difficulties. 
Financial crisis brought the sub-prime impact and put the global financial sector in need of a 
revolutionary reform, with risks of bankruptcy, growing deficits and loss of confidence on financial 
institutions. As a result, small companies were really struggling and only a few large companies could 
take advantage of consolidating the market by acquiring firms in their core industries (Grave et al., 
2012). 
China prospered in this financial crisis buying companies that suffer effects of sovereign-debt, 
focusing essentially on natural resources industry that has pioneered M&As innovation (Grave et al., 
2012). 
Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia companies have also made some steps to grow and 
started buying labor force to specific industry skills in some regions and then proceed to educate and 
build skills and offer good conditions to them to keep the key workers (Grave et al., 2012). 
 
2.4 Barriers and catalysts to M&As 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions involve a complex process, especially in cross-border deals. There 
are several features to pay attention to that could facilitate or make the deal harder.  Differences or 
shocks in terms of language, culture, believes and geographic differences are some of the turnoffs that 
we could find in the process, while, differences in valuation, governance standards and access to lower 
costs of production could make the process smoother. But the intention of the acquirer could be beyond 
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that, the technology, communication, travel improvements have facilitated deals for firms which want 
to enhance its global position and wide diversity (Grave et al., 2012). 
Most of the studies agree that cultural differences are barriers to cross-border M&As. However, 
it was found that in contrast with the announcement effect, in the long run, acquisitions are more 
successful if acquirer and target come from countries with different cultures (Chakrabarti, Gupta-
Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009).  
A merger or acquisition abroad could also be motivated by the acquirer’s will to get a quicker 
access to the markets where the target is located (Sharma, 2016). 
 
2.5 Determinants of acquirer’s returns 
 
Target status classify companies as public, private, joint ventures, subsidiaries and government 
companies, which has influence on bidder’s returns, essentially through two hypotheses. 
The first related to managerial motive, which says that bidder is not willing to pay high premiums 
for smaller and less-known unlisted firms motivated by synergies that could be created with the deal, 
which does not increase the acquisition price. It is important to keep on mind that is easier to integrate 
small private targets than large listed targets. For these reasons some authors believe that bidders 
could have more benefits by acquiring private targets than public targets (Draper & Paudyal, 2006). 
The second hypothesis is related to liquidity. Good standards of information are required in order 
to not have liquidity issues. However, usually there is lack and poor information for unlisted targets, 
which arises problems of liquidity. Due to illiquid targets, acquirer’s bargaining power is enhanced, 
which also suggests that bidders of private targets are more likely to have higher gains, increasing the 
likelihood of underpaying (Chang, 1998; Draper & Paudyal, 2006). 
 Draper and Paudyal (2006) split their sample into two, one for listed targets and the other for 
unlisted. They find that acquirers of public targets deal with a significant loss, on average, of 0.4% 
around the deal announcement. On the other hand, a positive return up to 2,19% is observed when 
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unlisted targets are involved. These results seem to support the hypotheses of managerial motive and 
liquidity. 
Focusing now on means of payment, there are many studies which supports the idea that the 
payment choices can influence the stock excess returns, and that happens due asymmetric information 
and, also, insufficient corporate monitoring. 
Apparently, the means of payment could transmit some signs about the market price and 
consequently influence the stock gains. If the bidder company sees its stocks undervalued the acquirer 
could pursue a merger or acquisition paid in cash, otherwise, the acquirer’s manager has incentives 
to choose a stock payment (Chang, 1998).  
It is expected a positive impact on returns if the payment is made in cash and a negative impact 
if it is made in stock (Loughran & Vijh, 1997). Still, there is some studies that find no abnormal returns 
from a cash offering (Chang, 1998). 
Other studies seem to agree with the idea that if the acquirer does the payment in stock suffers 
a decline in its share price, and the opposite happens if the payment is made in cash. The effect is 
expected to be the same also for the target’s stock price (Draper & Paudyal, 1999). 
A study by Draper and Paudyal (2006) shows that bidders that use cash as mean of payment, 
reveal excess returns around the announcement date, by approximately 2%. On the other hand, and 
contrary to other studies, they did not find a significant loss, on average, regarding payments in shares. 
The results are slightly different when the analysis is made for listed and unlisted targets.  
Regarding listed targets, the results are sensitive concerning cash payments and there is a 
significant drop in case of a stock payment, empowering the hypothesis of asymmetric information, 
and this payment could be comparable to the act of issuing equity to the public.  As far as unlisted 
targets are concerned, a cash payment has a significant impact on returns, and so does a payment in 
stock, however, in the last method of payment the results are not significant post-event period. In this 
study, the impact on bidder’s shareholders for unlisted targets are positive either for cash or stock 
payment  (Draper & Paudyal, 2006). 
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Privately held targets acquisitions paid in stock may create blockholders, since private targets are 
managed by a small group of people. Blockholders can have two different effects, it could serve as a 
group of people who cares about monitoring managerial performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
However, the reverse effect could happen if that ownership concentration make the blockholders acting 
to maximize only their wealth or if makes deals more expensive (Fama& Jensen, 1983), Stulz (1988), 
(Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). 
A payment in stock can also have a negative impact on bidder’s returns if the acquirer pays in 
stock to a publicly traded target with many shareholders who are dealing with asymmetric information 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
Some studies have found that companies that are used to make many mergers and 
acquisitions, called serial acquirers, earn lower returns up a certain number of deals (Boubakri, Chan, 
& Kooli, 2012; Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002). This result may be explained by “anticipation 
effect”, which means that the market is able to identify serial acquirers, and, therefore, the 
announcement returns are reduced with additional M&As (Karolyi, Liao, & Loureiro, 2015). Another 
explanation to the lower announcement returns could be given by agency costs required to monitor 
serial acquirers, that can destroy investment value to create an “illusion of growth” (Jensen, 2005), 
that illusion could be motivated by acquirer’s overconfident after successful previous deals – 
management hubris (Billett & Qian, 2008). 
Management hubris is many times related to the firm’s size, the bigger the company is, more 
confident the managers are. Usually large firms start from negative dollar synergies due to the higher 
acquisition premiums that they are willing to pay. That could explain why small firms overperform large 
firms, exceeding the large firms’ abnormal returns by 2.24 percentage points (Moeller, Schlingemann 
& Stulz, 2004). 
Serial acquirers are gaining importance as far as M&As are concerned, to reinforce this idea 
it was found that 1/5 of listed acquirers is a serial acquirer.  Serials acquirers act not only in the 
domestic market and industry, but, they pursue more and more in cross-border deals and in different 
industries, which is motivated by changes of industrial competition (Karolyi et al., 2015). 
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 Other factor that has impact on bidder’s returns in this kind of deals is differences between 
the bidder and target corporate governance standards. If acquirer is from a country that offers better 
protection, then, the synergies generated could be higher, and it may be anticipated that target assets 
would be better managed, leading to abnormal returns (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Also, 
macroeconomic factors, such as GDP (that can be related to corporate governance)  may lead to 
international expansion, through mergers and acquisitions, for example (Boateng, Hua, Uddin, & Du, 
2013). 
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3. Hypotheses  
 
As it was mentioned, there is lack of studies that relate the effects of currency depreciations 
with the impact of returns on cross-border deals. That’s why I will try to establish a link between 
depreciation variables with target status and acquirer’s and target’s industries. 
Based on literature review a depreciation event should bring positive returns to the bidder 
(Goldberg & Koistad, 1994). Plus, if the company is seeking a specific asset that is able to generate 
returns in multiple currencies, it may take advantage from a currency depreciation to get access to get 
access to that asset at a lower cost (Guo & Trivedi, 2002). On the side of FDI (which includes cross-
border M&As), the higher is the exchange rate volatility the higher is the investment (Guo & Trivedi, 
2002). Given this, it is expected that depreciation leads to higher CARs. 
Regarding target status, if the target is private, the announcement returns are expected to be 
higher regardless the mean of payment used (Draper & Paudyal, 2006). So, in interaction with currency 
depreciation variables it is expected a positive impact on the CARs from this interaction. 
At last, if the acquirer and target play in the same industry the impact of currency shocks on 
bidder’s returns is expected to be positive (Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991), which makes me believe that 
the interaction of the industry variables with depreciation variables would once more lead to a positive 
impact on the CARs. 
In this study I have to lower the recommended level of depreciation to consider a currency 
shock, that’s why besides the variable “aftershock” I also use the variable “multipleshocks” to see if 
the effect of the second is stronger or more significant. For this reason, I will test two hypotheses, one 
of them related to the variable “aftershock” and the other with the variable “multipleshocks”. Each 
hypothesis will be divided into two parts, according to the interactions above mentioned. 
I am going to test the following hypotheses: 
H1) bidders obtain higher announcement returns when they acquire a target from countries that have 
suffered a currency depreciation.  
 H1a) The effect of H1 is enlarge when the target is private 
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 H1b) The effect of H1 is enlarge when acquirer and target play in the same industry  
H2) bidders obtain higher announcement returns when they acquire a target from countries that have 
suffered multiple currency depreciations. 
H2a) The effect of H2 is enlarge when the target is private 
H2a) The effect of H2 is enlarge when acquirer and target play in the same industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
4 Methodology 
 
4.1 Event Study 
 
This study aims to measure the impact of currency shocks on announcement returns in cross-
border M&As for acquirers from Eurozone, the UK and the USA. 
In order to measure those returns, I will use the same methodology used by Frankel and Rose 
(1996)  event study methodology, that is the most used method to assess the value creation resulted 
of M&As.  
An event study is made in order to measure a specific event on the value of a given firm, in 
this case, we will measure the impact of a cross-border merger or acquisition on the firm value. First, 
we have to define an event window, that is typically very short, a few days before the event and a few 
days after. We also, need to define the estimation window, that will end a few days before the event 
window, to not take the risk of contamination. The estimation window (by average) will help us 
estimating the expected stock price if the event doesn’t occur. Then, we just need to compute the 
difference between the expected stock price without the event and the actual stock price to get the 
expected returns. 
The abnormal return (AR) for any company j in day t is given by: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 = 𝑅𝑗𝜏 − 𝛼?̂? − 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝜏, 
where 𝑅𝑖𝜏 represents the realized stock return at day t, the predicted return is given by 𝛼?̂? − 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝜏 
that is the estimate of the shareholder return if the takeover hadn’t happened, finally 𝜏 may assume 
different values, is equal to zero at the time of the announcement, is equal to 1 one day after the 
announcement, is equal to -1 one day before the announcement and so on. It is important to say that 
the control return is estimated from α and β that are computed from the regression of the individual 
firm return, based on the market return (𝑅𝑚𝜏) for the 255-day period ending 25 days before the 
announcement. 
Finally, the cumulative abnormal return - (CAR) between any 2 dates (𝜏𝑎 and 𝜏𝑏) is given by: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗(𝜏1,𝜏2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑗𝜏
𝑖=𝜏𝑎
𝑖=𝜏𝑏
. 
In this study I use three window lengths, ±1 (𝜏𝑎 = −1 and 𝜏𝑏 = 1),±2  (𝜏𝑎 = −2 and 
𝜏𝑏 = 2)  and ±5  (𝜏𝑎 = −5 and 𝜏𝑏 = 5). The CARs will be computed for each deal. 
 
4.2 Regressions 
 
In order to test if a currency depreciation in the target’s country leads to positive abnormal 
returns for the bidder, being the dependent variable the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), I will test 
the null hypothesis - the event has no impact on firm value.  
As currency shocks would take time to be noticed, under this hypothesis, I use the variable 
“aftershock”, which is the variable of greatest interest in this analysis, it is a dummy variable and is 
equal to one in the four quarters after the shock. Moreover, there will be an interaction of this variable 
with acquirer and target’s industries and target public status. 
Under the first hypothesis the following regressions are used for each of the three samples in 
this study: 
1𝑐𝑎𝑟 (𝜏1, 𝜏2) =𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡+𝛽2𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ+𝛽3𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘+𝛽4𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑞 +
𝛽6𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑔𝑑𝑝(𝑡) +𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝑉(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛽9𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛽10𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 +
𝛽11𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑘_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛿1𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛿2𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀                        1𝑎) 
Where, 𝑐𝑎𝑟 (𝜏1, 𝜏2)  is the dependent variable that represents the cumulative abnormal return for a 
given event window, which is computed for each deal; “privatetarget” is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to 1 if the target is private; “cash” is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the deal payment 
is made exclusively in cash; “stock” is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the deal payment is 
made exclusively in stock; “sameindustry” is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if acquirer and 
target operate in the same industry; “serialacq” is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if over the all 
sample the bidder acquires more than five times; “acqgdp” is the GDP growth rate of the acquirer’s 
nation in the year of the deal; “lnacqsize( t-1)” is the logarithmic variable of the acquirer’s total assets, 
one year before the deal; “MBV t-1” is the logarithmic variable of the acquirer’s market-to-book value, 
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one year before the deal, in the acquirer’s currency ; “leverage t-1” is the ratio of Total Liabilities/Total 
Assets, one year before the deal, in the acquirer’s currency; “aftershock” is a dummy variable, which 
is equal to 1 in the four quarters after the currency shock; “aftershock_privatetarget” is a dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 for private targets four quarters after a currency shock ; “acqindustry” 
represents dummies for acquirer industries (classified by the 2-digit SIC-codes); finally “targetnation” 
represents dummies for the target’s Nation . 
 
𝑐𝑎𝑟 (𝜏1, 𝜏2) =𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡+𝛽2𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ+𝛽3𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘+𝛽4𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑞 +
𝛽6𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑔𝑑𝑝(𝑡) + 𝛽7 𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛽8 𝑀𝐵𝑉(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛽9 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑡 − 1) +
𝛽10 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘+𝛽11𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝛿1𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +
𝛿2𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛+ 𝜀                                                                                                                                   1𝑏) 
All the variables are defined above, except “aftershock_sameindustry” that is a dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 for acquirers and targets that play in the same industry (classified by the 
2-digit SIC-codes) four quarters after a currency shock. 
Under the second hypothesis the following regressions are used for each of the three samples 
in this study: 
𝑐𝑎𝑟 (𝜏1, 𝜏2) =𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡+𝛽2𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ+𝛽3𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘+𝛽4𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑞 +
𝛽6𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑔𝑑𝑝(𝑡) +𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝑉(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛽9𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛽10𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 +
𝛽11𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛿1𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛿2𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀                             2𝑎) 
All the variables are defined above, except “multipleshocks” that is a dummy variable, which 
is equal to 1 if in the last four quarters there were at least two currency shocks; and also the variable 
“multipleshocks_privatetarget that is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for private targets if in the 
last four quarters there were at least two currency shocks. 
 
𝑐𝑎𝑟 (𝜏1, 𝜏2)=𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡+𝛽2𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ+𝛽3𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘+𝛽4𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑞 +
𝛽6𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑔𝑑𝑝(𝑡) +𝛽7 𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛽8 𝑀𝐵𝑉(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛽9 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑡 − 1) +
𝛽10 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑘𝑠+𝛽11𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠_𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝛿1𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +
𝛿2𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛+ 𝜀                                                                                                                                  2𝑏) 
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 All the variables are defined above, except “multipleshocks_sameindustry” that is a dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 for acquirers and targets that play in the same industry (classified by the 
2-digit SIC-codes) if there were at least 2 currency shocks in the last 4 quarters. 
 As I include the variable “targetnation” in all regressions, in the Eurozone sample, I could 
have added a variable for acquirer’s nation, because it is the only sample with more than one 
acquirer. However, I already have the variable “acqgdp” that already captures some characteristics 
of acquirer’s country.  Plus, in this way all the regressions are exactly the same among the three 
samples. 
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5.Data 
 
From SDC Platinum, we gathered three samples regarding cross-borders M&As. The first when 
the acquirer is in one of the countries that belong to the Eurozone, while the target is not included in 
that group of countries. The second when the acquirer is from the UK in relation to foreign targets. 
Finally, the third sample includes US acquirers and non-US targets. I downloaded the data for deals 
announcements between 2009 and 2018. 
Attending to the methodology used, I had to apply some criteria on these samples, using the 
following filters: 
1) Bidder must be listed 
2) Keep only 1 deal per month for each bidder 
3) Bidder must acquire at least 30% of the target 
4) Bidder must own more than 50% of the target after the deal 
5) Drop the observation if there is no informational available about Acquirer Net Assets1, 
Acquirer Liabilities2 and Acquirer Market to Book Value3 or if it was not possible to gather 
enough returns to compute the Cumulative Abnormal Returns. 
6) Targets that represent less than 3% of the total deals are eliminated. 
 
The first filter must be used, otherwise it would not be possible to compute the bidder’s CAR, 
that is the dependent variable in this analysis.  
The second is used to avoid contamination in case of multiple events. 
The third and fourth are used to guarantee representative and significant deals. 
The fifth filter has to be used because with no information about those variables it wouldn’t be 
possible to run the regressions. 
                                                          
1 In relation to the year before transaction. 
2 In relation to the year before transaction. 
3 In relation to the year before transaction. 
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Finally, the last filter allows us to select the main target’s countries for each acquirer, which 
makes the analysis easier. If this filter was not used, we would have to download innumerous exchange 
rates, CPIs , making all the computations necessary to get our currency shocks and other variables for 
deals that are not much significant. 
Now, in the clean samples we have a total of 1204 observations for Eurozone, 763 
observations for the UK and 2126 observations for the US. 
Looking at the table 1, we can see that all the UK main targets are on the US and Eurozone 
list, excluding of course situations of Target Nation=Acquirer Nation. The US and UK lists have a few 
more Target Nations, and they have almost the same main targets, except Switzerland and Sweden on 
the Eurozone side and France on the US side. 
To sum up, the most repeated Target nations are from United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Netherlands, Brazil, Canada and Australia. 
 
 
 
Table 1 Target Nations 
 
 
Panel A : Acquirers from Eurozone 
Target Nation Freq. Percent Cum. 
United States 526 30.42 30.42 
United Kingdom 267 15.44 45.86 
Switzerland 107 6.19 52.05 
Sweden 86 4.97 57.03 
Brazil 85 4.92 61.94 
Canada 68 3.93 65.88 
Australia 65 3.76 69.64 
The table shows the Target Nations for each 
acquirer sample, after the last filter is applied 
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Panel B: Acquirer from the United Kingdom 
Target Nation Freq. Percent Cum 
United States 479 40.63 40.63 
Australia 87 7.38 48.01 
Germany 79 6.7 54.71 
Canada 59 5 59.71 
Netherlands 59 5 64.72 
 
Panel C: Acquirer from the United States 
Target Nation Freq. Percent Cum. 
United Kingdom 700 19.68 19.68 
Canada 551 15.49 35.17 
Germany 265 7.45 42.62 
Australia 203 5.71 48.33 
France 156 4.39 52.71 
Netherlands 136 3.82 56.54 
Brazil 115 3.23 59.77 
 
 
Being the Eurozone sample, the only one with more than one Acquirer Nation, it is relevant to 
see from where are the main bidders from. Looking at table 2, we can see that bidders from France, 
Germany, Finland and Netherlands represent almost of 80% of the Eurozone sample. 
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Table 2 Deals by acquirer nation 
NATION FREQ. PERCENT CUM. 
FRANCE 427 35.47 35.47 
GERMANY 276 22.92 58.39 
FINLAND 127 10.55 68.94 
NETHERLANDS 119 9.88 78.82 
ITALY 59 4.90 83.72 
BELGIUM 50 4.15 87.87 
SPAIN 47 3.90 91.78 
IRELAND-REP 44 3.65 95.43 
LUXEMBOURG 30 2.49 97.92 
AUSTRIA 20 1.66 99.58 
ESTONIA 2 0.17 99.75 
GREECE 2 0.17 99.92 
PORTUGAL 1 0.08 100.00 
TOTAL 1204 100.00   
 
In table 3 we can find some statistics of our main variables used in our regressions for our 3 
samples. 
 The variable “privatetarget” assume similar values for the 3 samples, according its mean, 
which is 61.8%, 62.6% and 65.6%, for deals from the Eurozone, the UK and the USA, respectively. We 
can then conclude that more than 60% of our deals involve a private target. 
 Moving to “cash” and “stock”, we can observe that in the 3 samples, it is found that the 
percentage of deals paid in stock doesn’t go beyond 3%. On the other hand, only cash payments 
represent 12% for the Eurozone deals, 27.2% for the UK deals and 15.2% for the US deals. 
 We classified industries as Rose, Sørheim and Lerkerød (2017) do, using the two-digit SIC 
code. Our statistics indicate that about 50-52% of our sample deals are made by acquirers and targets 
that play in the same industry. 
The table shows how many deals are made by 
each acquirer of the Eurozone sample 
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 If the acquirer is involved in more than 5 deals over the sample, it is characterized as “serial 
acquirer”, there are several possible classifications for serial acquirers, this one follows Karolyi et al. 
(2015). Looking at the tables we can conclude that either the Eurozone or the UK have the presence 
of a serial acquirer for more than half of the deal, 52.1% and 54,6%, respectively. Regarding the US 
this value is a bit lower, 41.6%. 
 The variable “aftershock”, that is equal to 1 in the 4 quarters after the deprecation shock, 
covers 24.4%, 13,3% and 43,1% of the total deals for the Eurozone, the UK and the US samples. 
“Multipleshocks”, that is equal to 1 if in the last 4 quarters there were at least 2 shocks, covers 7.7%, 
2,24% and 23,4%, respectively. Finally, the variable “shock” that is equal to 1 if there is a shock in 
relation to the same quarter of the previous year, covers 7.7%, 4.61% and 4,31%, respectively. After 
this, it is possible to understand that the US acquirers see its target’s currencies devaluated more 
frequently than the Eurozone and the UK. Even the “multipleshocks” frequency is much higher for the 
US than the other two groups. 
 The variable “acqgdp” represents the GDP growth (annual %) of the acquirer’s nation, by the 
table above we can see that half of the deals occur in years for which GDP growth is up to 1.51%, 
1.823% and 2.250% for the Eurozone, the UK and the US samples, respectively. The maximum values 
for this variable are quite similar for the UK and the US, that are 2.948% and 2.881%, and is much 
higher for the Eurozone sample, 25.12% which is explained because in this sample there are many 
acquirers. The maximum value for the Eurozone sample belongs to Ireland, and its growths are quite 
unstable over the sample, it reaches a minimum of 0.18% in 2012 and the referred maximum in 2015. 
 Acquirer’s total assets in the year before the deal is characterized as “totalassets(t-1)”, it is 
measured according to the acquirer’s currency, which means that is not correct to make comparisons 
among the three samples. In the Eurozone sample half of the acquirers had in the year before the deal 
total assets valued up to 2.699 million €, the UK 0.690338 million £ and the US 1.030 million $. 
 Regarding the acquirer’s Market-to-Book Value in the year before the deal represented as 
“MBV(t-1)”, has similar medians among the Eurozone, the UK and the US, 2.040, 2.280 and 2.430, 
respectively, which means that acquirers from the US are more valued by the market. 
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 Finally, the leverage ratio in the year before the deal, “leverage(t-1)”, which is computed by 
the ratio Total Liabilities (t-1) / Total Assets (t-1), is once more quite similar for the Eurozone, the UK 
and the USA, regarding medians, that display values of 0.58,0.50,0,52, respectively.  
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean p50 Sd min max 
       
Privatetarget 1,195 0.618 1 0.486 0 1 
Cash 1,195 0.120 0 0.325 0 1 
Stock 1,195 0.0117 0 0.108 0 1 
Sameindustry 1,195 0.520 1 0.500 0 1 
Serialacq 1,195 0.521 1 0.500 0 1 
Aftershock 1,195 0.244 0 0.430 0 1 
Multipleshocks 1,195 0.0770 0 0.267 0 1 
Shock 1,195 0.0770 0 0.267 0 1 
Acqgdp 1,195 1.338 1.551 2.782 -9.132 25.12 
Totalassets(t-1) million€ 1,195 8.595 2.699 1.1940 67,709 3.8790 
MBV (t-1) 1,195 2.321 2.040 1.228 0.890 4.680 
Leverage (t-1) 1,195 0.579 0.582 0.143 0.338 0.786 
       
 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the main variables of each sample, the variables “acqgdp”, 
“totalassets” and “MBV” were winsoried at 1% level of each tail, in order to remove extreme values that could 
bias our results. 
The meaning of each variable can be consulted in the appendix. 
Panel A: Eurozone sample 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean p50 Sd min max 
       
Privatetarget 760 0.626 1 0.484 0 1 
Cash 760 0.272 0 0.445 0 1 
Stock 760 0.0250 0 0.156 0 1 
Sameindustry 760 0.513 1 0.500 0 1 
Serialacq 760 0.546 1 0.498 0 1 
Aftershock 760 0.133 0 0.340 0 1 
Multipleshocks 760 0.0224 0 0.148 0 1 
Shock 760 0.0461 0 0.210 0 1 
Acqgdp 760 1.397 1.823 1.830 -4.188 2.948 
Totalassets(t-1) million £ 760 2.340 0.690338 3.637 33,128 1.2930 
MBV(t-1) 760 2.730 2.280 1.640 0.890 5.980 
Leverage (t-1) 760 0.502 0.504 0.185 0.208 0.799 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: UK sample 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N mean p50 sd min max 
       
Privatetarget 2,118 0.656 1 0.475 0 1 
Cash 2,118 0.152 0 0.359 0 1 
Stock 2,118 0.0165 0 0.128 0 1 
Sameindustry 2,118 0.500 1 0.500 0 1 
Serialacq 2,118 0.416 0 0.493 0 1 
Aftershock 2,118 0.431 0 0.495 0 1 
Multipleshocks 2,118 0.234 0 0.424 0 1 
Shock 2,118 0.183 0 0.387 0 1 
Acqgdp 2,118 1.923 2.250 1.272 -2.537 2.881 
Totalassets(t-1) million$ 2,118 2.700 1.030 3.638 66,460 1.2410 
MBV 2,118 2.847 2.430 1.675 0.930 6.270 
Leverage 2,118 0.524 0.523 0.193 0.219 0.827 
       
 
  
Panel C: US sample 
 
26 
 
 
5.1 Currency Shocks 
 
In order to identify the most relevant variable in this work, is necessary to identify currency 
shocks as a result of depreciation episodes, which will be crucial to understand how shocks affect our 
CARs. 
Usually currency shocks episodes are characterized as a depreciation of at least 25%, in 
relation to another currency, for differences computed in relation to the same quarter of the previous 
year (Desai, Foley, & Forbes, 2008; Frankel & Roseb, 1996). However, following the same values I 
was not able to find any currency shocks for the target’s currencies for the UK sample, regarding the 
Eurozone sample I only found  shock for Brazil and in the US sample I found 8 shocks for Brazil and 
1 for France and Australia (no shocks for the remaining 3 targets). Lowering the reference value to 
15% the currency shocks improve significantly for the US sample, and the Eurozone sample, however 
in the last sample I did not find shocks for Canada and Switzerland, for the UK sample I only got 1 
shock for Canada and 2 shocks for Australia (no shocks for the three remaining target’s countries). In 
order to assess better results, I will consider that there is a currency shock when there is a depreciation 
of 10% at least, in relation to the same quarter in the year before – homologous analysis. Plus, I 
compute currency changes computing real exchange rates, using for that effect the CPI for the required 
countries.  
In this analysis was required to extract from Datastream the quarterly nominal exchange rates4  
from the main target’s currencies to acquirer’s currencies. 
 For the Eurozone sample, I obtained ( x US $ to 1), ( x £ to 1€), ( x Swiss franc to 1€), ( x 
Brazilian real to 1€), ( x Swedish krona to 1€), ( x Canadian $ to 1€) and ( x Australian $ to 1€).  
Regarding the UK sample, I obtained ( x US $ to 1£), ( x Australian $ to 1£), ( x € to 1£) and 
( x Canadian $ to 1£). 
                                                          
4 Exchange rates were collected from 4 quarters before the beginning of the sample untill the end, in order to 
identify shocks from the beginning if necessary. Those 4 quarters are necessary, because it is made a 
homologous analysis, and for that reason we will get missing values from the first 4 quarters. 
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Finally, for the last sample, I obtained ( x £ to 1 US $), ( x Canadian $ to 1 US $), ( x € to 1 
US $), ( x Australian $ to 1 US $) and ( x Brazilian real to 1 US $). 
 Then, those exchange rates were adjusted to the rate of inflation, using for that purpose the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)5, of each target country, which was also gathered from Datastream. 
Table 4 Depreciations against acquirer's currency 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Following the same line as exchange rates, also, the CPIs were gathered from 4 quarters before the sample 
untill 2018. 
Panel A: Depreciations against € 
US $ 3 
shocks 
2009(Q4) 2011(Q2) 2018(Q1) 
UK: £ 3 
shocks 
2009(Q1) 2016(Q3,Q4) 
Swiss franc 0 
shocks 
- 
Brazilian 
real 
10 
shocks 
2009(Q1) 2013(Q3,Q4) 2014(Q1) 2015(Q3,Q4) 2016(Q1) 
2018(Q1,Q2,Q3) 
Sweden 
krona 
2 
shocks 
2009(Q1,Q2)  
Canadian $ 3 
shocks 
2013(Q3,Q4) 2014(Q1) 
Panel B: Depreciations against £ 
US $ 1 shock 2009(Q4) 
Australia $ 4 shocks 2013(Q4) 2014(Q1,12) 2015(13) 
Canadian $ 4 shocks 2014(Q1,Q2),2015(Q3,Q4) 
Germany: € 1 shock 2015 (Q1) 
Netherlands: € 1 shock 2015(Q1) 
Table 4 shows the number of currency shocks found in the entire period for each sample, for 
year and quarters. 
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 Looking first at panel A, we can see that Brazilian real is the currency that suffers more from 
currency depreciation shocks against euro, having 11 shocks, the second currency with more shocks 
(6) is the Australian dollar, then we have the pound, the US dollar and the Canadian dollar with 3 
shocks, Sweden krona with 2 shocks and at last we have the Swiss franc without any shocks in the 
sample. 
 Moving to panel B, we can observe that there are not many currency shock depreciations 
against £, we have 4 shocks for Australian and Canadian dollar and only 1 shock for the US dollar and 
for euro (from France and Netherlands). 
 Finally, in panel C, we can observe the currency depreciations shocks in relation to the US 
dollar, as had happened in the Eurozone Sample, Brazil is once more the currency with more shocks 
(11), followed by Australian dollar, and euro (from Germany, France and Netherlands) with 9 shocks, 
then we have £ with 8 shocks and Canadian dollar with 7 shocks. The US sample is the one with more 
currency shocks in relation to the main target’s currencies. We can also highlight that either Eurozone 
sample or US sample display a devaluation of the pound in the 2 quarters after the Brexit referendum 
2016(Q3,Q4), in the US Sample those shocks are also followed by another 2 shocks, 2017(Q1,Q2). 
 
Panel C: Depreciations against the US $ 
UK: £ 8 
shocks 
2009(Q1,Q2,Q3) 2015(Q2) 2016(Q3,Q4), 2017(Q1,Q2) 
Canadian $ 7 
shocks 
2009(Q1,Q2,Q3) 2015(Q2,Q3,Q4) 2016(Q1) 
Germany: € 9 
shocks 
2009(Q1,Q2) 2010(Q3) 2012(Q3) 2015(Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4) 2016(Q1) 
Australian $ 9 
shocks 
2009(Q1,Q2,Q3) 2013(Q3) 2014(Q1) 2015(Q2,Q3,Q4) 2016(Q1) 
France: € 9 
shocks 
2009(Q1,Q2) 2010(Q3) 2012(Q3) 2015(Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4) 2016(Q1) 
Netherlands:€ 9 
shocks 
2009(Q1,Q2) 2010(Q3) 2012(Q3) 2015(Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4) 2016(Q1) 
Brazilian real 11 
shocks  
2009(Q1,Q2,Q3), 2012(Q3), 2014(Q1), 2015(Q2,Q3,Q4), 2016(Q1), 
2018(Q3,Q4) 
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Panel A: Eurozone sample 
Table 5 CARs analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
CAR(-1,+1) 
Aftershock obs Mean Median t-stats 
means 
Wilcoxon 
z-test 
0 903 0.009 0.003  
-2.345*** 
 
-1.071 1 292 0.017 0.004 
diff (1-0) 1195 0.008 0.001 
CAR(-2,+2) 
Aftershock obs Mean Median t-stats 
means 
Wilcoxon 
z-test 
0 903 0.010 0.004  
-1.075 
 
0.256 1 292 0.011 0.005 
diff (1-0) 1195 0.001 0.001 
CAR(-5,+5) 
Aftershock obs Mean Median t-stats 
means 
Wilcoxon 
z-test 
0 903 0.008 0.004  
-0.2906 
 
0.273 1 292 0.010 0.004 
diff (1-0) 1195 0.002 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 shows tests of equality of means and medians, it also shows t-stats 
and Wilcoxon-stats from the tests, respectively. *, **, *** stand for 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B: UK sample 
Panel C: US sample 
 
CAR(-1,+1) 
Aftershock obs Mean Median t-stats 
means 
Wilcoxon 
z-test 
0 659 0.012 0.005  
-0.638 
 
-0.266 1 101 0.016 0.008 
diff (1-0) 760 0.004 0.003 
CAR(-2,+2) 
Aftershock obs Mean Median t-stats 
means 
Wilcoxon 
z-test 
0 659 0.012 0.005  
-0.0228 
 
0.438 1 101 0.012 0.004 
diff (1-0) 760 0.000 -0.001 
CAR(-5,+5) 
Aftershock obs Mean Median t-stats 
means 
Wilcoxon 
z-test 
0 659 0.010 0.005  
-0.423 
 
0.077 1 101 0.014 0.006 
diff (1-0) 760 0.004 0.001 
 
 
CAR(-1,+1) 
Aftershock obs Mean Median t-stats 
means 
Wilcoxon 
z-test 
0 1205 0,006 0,002    
0,678 
 
1,215 1 913 0,003 0,000 
diff (1-0) 2118 -0,003 -0,002 
CAR(-2,+2) 
Aftershock obs Mean Median t-stats 
means 
Wilcoxon 
z-test 
0 1205 0,008 0,002  
0,9166 
 
0,567 1 913 0,002 0,001 
diff (1-0) 2118 -0,006 -0,001 
CAR(-5,+5) 
Aftershock obs Mean Median t-stats 
means 
Wilcoxon 
z-test 
0 1205 0,003 -0,001  
0,4164 
 
0,156 1 913 -0,002 0,000 
diff (1-0) 2118 -0,005 0,001 
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Looking at panel A from table 5 we can observe that the tests of equality of means and medians 
on CARS, that are computed for each deal. The results are only significant for the Eurozone CAR(-
1,+1), that is the cumulative abnormal return between one day before and one day after the 
announcement, which is statistically significant at 1% level and reveals that the mean for The CAR(-
1,+1) is always positive either if aftershock is equal to zero (0.9%) or to one(1.7%), but the impact is 
higher under the effect of aftershock=1, the difference between the means of CAR(-1,+1) when 
“aftershock”=1 and “aftershock”=0 is of 0.008, or 0.8 percentage points. The remaining insignificant 
Eurozone CARS are positive independent of the value that aftershock assumes, and there’s a higher  
impact for the deals that occur 4 quarters after a currency shock. The insignificant Eurozone medians 
are always positive and higher for deals that occurs 4 quarters after a currency shock, expect for CAR(-
5,+5). 
Looking at panel B, we can say that the UK Sample is not significant regarding the means and 
medians for the CARS. The table shows that all the CARS are positive either under the effect of 
depreciation or not, but they are higher for deals that occur 4 quarters after a currency shock, except 
for CAR(-2,+2) that the difference between the means is approximately zero. The medians are also 
positive for all situations, but higher for CAR(-1,+1) and CAR(-5,+5) when “aftershock”=1, and lower 
for the CAR(-2,+2). 
Moving to panel C, we can see that once more there is no significance for means and medians. 
The means for the CARS are always positive, except for CAR (-5,+5) when aftershock=1. Looking at 
the differences, we can also see that CARS are higher when “aftershock”=0, for all the CARS, which 
leads to better results when there is not a depreciation effect. Finally, looking at the medians they have 
always positive values whatever the value that “aftershock” assumes, except for CAR(-5,+5) when 
“aftershock”=0. The medians are higher when “aftershock”=0 for CAR(-1,+1) and CAR(-2,+2) and 
lower for CAR(-5,+5). 
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6. Empirical Results 
 
Table 6 Regressions to test the hypotheses H1a) and H1b) 
 
 
 
 
 
       
  H1a) H1a) H1a) H1b) H1b) H1b) 
VARIABLES car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) 
              
privatetarget 0.0006 0.0019 -0.0031 -0.0037 -0.0031 -0.00898** 
 (0.185) (0.538) (-0.705) (-1.185) (-0.932) (-2.180) 
cash -0.0018 0.0018 0.0001 -0.0020 0.0016 -0.0001 
 (-0.508) (0.489) (0.0226) (-0.554) (0.425) (-0.0193) 
stock 0.0087 0.0172 0.0117 0.0074 0.0154 0.0104 
 (0.364) (0.677) (0.337) (0.307) (0.606) (0.297) 
sameindustry 0.00850* 0.00929** 0.0122*** 0.00700** 0.00804** 0.00900** 
 (1.914) (2.200) (2.732) (2.293) (2.383) (2.103) 
serealacq 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 
 (0.0534) (0.0478) (-0.0385) (0.0781) (0.0686) (-0.00483) 
Table 6 displays the outputs for the regressions 1a) and 1b) for the CAR(-1,+1), CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5) 
for each sample. 
Panel A: Eurozone regressions of CARS- 1st hypothesis 
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acqgdp(t) -0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 
 (-0.302) (0.277) (-0.0200) (-0.331) (0.215) (-0.0201) 
lnacqsize(t-1) -0.0060*** -0.0060*** -0.0063*** -0.0061*** -0.0061*** -0.0065*** 
 (-3.086) (-3.324) (-3.284) (-3.005) (-3.261) (-3.309) 
MBV(t-1) 0.0041 0.0036 0.0035 0.0039 0.0035 0.0033 
 (1.497) (1.465) (1.420) (1.479) (1.422) (1.353) 
leverage(t-1) 0.0377** 0.0382** 0.0315 0.0390** 0.0396** 0.0333* 
 (2.097) (2.175) (1.596) (2.085) (2.190) (1.658) 
aftershock 0.0197 0.0184* 0.0162 0.00677* 0.0041 -0.0039 
 (1.600) (1.653) (1.550) (1.679) (0.889) (-0.612) 
aftershock_privatetarget -0.0167 -0.0197* -0.0230**    
 (-1.427) (-1.789) (-2.014)    
aftershock_sameindustry    0.0055 0.0044 0.0121 
    (0.530) (0.440) (1.127) 
Constant 0.0514 0.0446 0.0859** 0.0547 0.0480 0.0915** 
 (1.522) (1.363) (2.257) (1.549) (1.416) (2.318) 
       
Observations 1,195 1,195 1,195 1,195 1,195 1,195 
R-squared 0.102 0.109 0.108 0.098 0.104 0.104 
Acquirer Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Target Nation Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
     
            
 
 
 
 
Note: The estimations from the regression 1a) and 1b) presented in section 4 are presented in this table. The 
dependent variables are the CAR(-1,+1), CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5), all variables definition can be consulted in 
the appendix. The variables “acqgdp”, “totalassets” and “MBV” were winsoried at 1% level of each tail, in order 
to remove extreme values that could bias our results. . T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that 
the coefficient estimates are significant at 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.  
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  H1a) H1a) H1a) H1b) H1b) H1b) 
VARIABLES car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) 
              
privatetarget -0.0047 -0.0039 -0.0099 -0.0058 -0.0052 -0.0127 
 (-0.810) (-0.578) (-1.187) (-1.047) (-0.801) (-1.583) 
cash 0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0060 0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0061 
 (0.395) (-0.343) (-0.743) (0.412) (-0.333) (-0.753) 
stock -0.0025 0.0167 0.0017 -0.0024 0.0168 0.0016 
 (-0.0779) (0.392) (0.0362) (-0.0732) (0.395) (0.0326) 
sameindustry -0.0070 -0.0076 -0.0035 -0.0061 -0.0070 -0.0044 
 (-1.542) (-1.444) (-0.480) (-1.251) (-1.243) (-0.577) 
serealacq -0.0019 -0.0061 -0.0098 -0.0017 -0.0060 -0.0097 
 (-0.319) (-0.871) (-1.054) (-0.284) (-0.845) (-1.046) 
acqgdp(t) -0.00304* -0.0030 -0.0045 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0044 
 (-1.657) (-1.483) (-1.594) (-1.644) (-1.470) (-1.571) 
lnacqsize(t-1) -0.0058*** -0.0051** -0.0035 -0.0058*** -0.0051** -0.0034 
 (-2.778) (-2.152) (-1.068) (-2.759) (-2.137) (-1.050) 
MBV(t-1) -0.0009 0.0005 0.0019 -0.0009 0.0005 0.0020 
 (-0.657) (0.272) (0.928) (-0.660) (0.275) (0.959) 
leverage(t-1) 0.0208 0.0182 0.0007 0.0207 0.0180 0.0000 
 (1.138) (0.818) (0.0246) (1.131) (0.809) (-0.0005) 
aftershock 0.0187 0.0179 0.0285 0.0145 0.0111 0.0072 
 (1.312) (1.086) (1.405) (1.370) (0.919) (0.459) 
aftershock_privatetarget -0.0116 -0.0135 -0.0259    
 (-0.707) (-0.720) (-1.102)    
Panel B: UK regressions of CARS- 1st hypothesis 
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aftershock_sameindustry    -0.0078 -0.0055 0.0048 
    (-0.583) (-0.366) (0.255) 
Constant 0.126*** 0.133*** 0.153*** 0.125*** 0.132*** 0.153*** 
 (4.257) (4.039) (3.537) (4.212) (4.020) (3.544) 
       
Observations 760 760 760 760 760 760 
R-squared 0.104 0.081 0.093 0.103 0.080 0.091 
Acquirer Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Target Nation Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
     
     
       
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The estimations from the regression 1a) and 1b) presented in section 4 are presented in this table. The 
dependent variables are the CAR(-1,+1), CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5), all variables definition can be consulted in 
the appendix. The variables “acqgdp”, “totalassets” and “MBV” were winsoried at 1% level of each tail, in order 
to remove extreme values that could bias our results. . T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that 
the coefficient estimates are significant at 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.  
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  H1a) H1a) H1a) H1b) H1b) H1b) 
VARIABLES car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) 
              
privatetarget -0.0031 -0.0045 -0.0290 -0.0053 -0.0055 -0.0269 
 (-0.311) (-0.340) (-1.001) (-0.668) (-0.500) (-1.112) 
cash -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0104 -0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0097 
 (-0.611) (-0.174) (-1.063) (-0.562) (-0.142) (-1.023) 
stock 0.0009 0.1320 -0.0001 0.0022 0.1330 0.0011 
 (0.00813) (0.740) (-0.00436) (0.0186) (0.743) (0.00373) 
sameindustry 0.0064 0.0002 0.0159 0.0162 0.0071 0.0346 
 (0.894) (0.0173) (0.677) (1.584) (0.459) (1.059) 
serealacq 0.00512** 0.0053 0.0103** 0.00563** 0.0057 0.0112** 
 (1.984) (1.546) (2.144) (2.118) (1.621) (2.300) 
acqgdp(t) -0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0042 -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0037 
 (-0.354) (-1.147) (-1.626) (-0.254) (-1.056) (-1.473) 
lnacqsize(t-1) -0.0057** -0.0061** -0.0044 -0.0056** -0.0061** -0.0043 
 (-2.472) (-2.182) (-1.001) (-2.462) (-2.170) (-0.975) 
MBV(t-1) -0.0030 -0.0024 -0.0001 -0.0030 -0.0024 0.0000 
 (-1.413) (-0.870) (-0.0156) (-1.408) (-0.865) (-0.00694) 
leverage(t-1) 0.0307 0.0434 0.0204 0.0310 0.0437 0.0213 
 (0.872) (0.880) (0.229) (0.884) (0.888) (0.241) 
aftershock -0.0016 -0.0086 -0.0090 0.0073 -0.0014 0.0178 
 (-0.345) (-1.177) (-0.925) (1.273) (-0.132) (0.914) 
aftershock_privatetarget -0.0037 -0.0014 0.0074    
 (-0.539) (-0.154) (0.481)    
aftershock_sameindustry    -0.0227** -0.0161 -0.0440* 
Panel C: US regressions of CARS- 1st hypothesis 
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    (-2.374) (-1.191) (-1.800) 
Constant 0.0772*** 0.0751*** 0.0037 0.0800*** 0.0763*** -0.0005 
 (5.035) (3.483) (0.121) (5.337) (3.638) (-0.0156) 
       
Observations 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,112 
R-squared 0.037 0.086 0.095 0.040 0.087 0.096 
Acquirer Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Target Nation Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
      
      
       
       
 
Note: The estimations from the regression 1a) and 1b) presented in section 4 are presented in this table. The 
dependent variables are the CAR(-1,+1), CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5), all variables definition can be consulted in 
the appendix. The variables “acqgdp”, “totalassets” and “MBV” were winsoried at 1% level of each tail, in order 
to remove extreme values that could bias our results. . T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that 
the coefficient estimates are significant at 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.  
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6.1 Hypothesis 1a) 
 
Regarding our hypothesis H1 a) we can see that the variable “aftershock” is only significant 
for the Eurozone sample, at 1% level, for CAR (-2,+2), displaying a beta of 0.0184, which means that, 
on average, a deal made 4 quarters after a currency shock, has a positive impact of 1.84 percentage 
points on the CAR(-2,+2), ceteris paribus. Despite all the remaining “aftershock” variables are 
insignificant for 1a) regressions, they have a positive impact for the Eurozone and UK CARs, and a 
negative impact on all the US CARs. 
The interaction between aftershock and privatetarget, variable “aftershock_privatetarget”, is 
only significant for the Eurozone sample, for the CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5), at 1% level. Then, we can 
say, that, on average, a deal that involves a private target in the 4 quarters after a currency shock, has 
an impact on cars of -1.97 percentage points and -2.30 percentage points, respectively. Although the 
remaining “aftershock_privatetarget” variables are insignificant all of them have a negative impact on 
the car, except for the US CAR(-5,+5), ceteris paribus. 
Looking at the significant values I am not able to say that the hypothesis H1 is enlarged with 
the interaction between the variables “aftershock” and “privatetarget” for the Eurozone CAR(-2,+2) 
that is the only one with significant coefficients for the variable “aftershock” and 
“aftershock_privatetarget”. In this case a private target does not contribute to higher CARS. 
 
6.2 Hypothesis 1b) 
 
Moving to the hypothesis 1b) related to 1b) regressions, we can see that once more, we only 
can observe a significant coefficient of 0.00677 for “aftershock”, significant at 1% level, from the 
Eurozone sample, CAR(-1,+1). Then, on average, when a deal occurs 4 quarters after a currency shock 
there’s a little positive impact of 0.677 percentage points on the CAR(-1,+1), ceteris paribus. All the 
remaining aftershock variables for this hypothesis are positive, expect the US CAR(-2,+2). 
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 The interaction between aftershock and same industry, variable “aftershock_sameindustry”, 
is only significant for the US CAR(-1,+1) and CAR(-5,+5), at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This means 
that on average, a deal that involves an acquirer and target that play in the same industry, have a 
negative impact of 2.27 percentage points and 4.4 percentage points on CAR(-1,+1) and CAR(-5,+5), 
respectively, ceteris paribus. The remaining “aftershock_sameindustry” for regresions 1b) are only 
positive for all the Eurozone sample, being consistent to the “aftershock” positive betas, and also for 
the UK CAR(-5,+5). 
 To sum up, due to the insignificant coefficients I am not able to say that the bidder’s return in 
the 4 quarters after a currency shock are enlarged when target and acquirer play in the same industry. 
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Table 7 Regressions to test the hypotheses H2a) and H2b) 
 
 
 
       
  H2a) H2a) H2a) H2b)  H2b) H2b) 
VARIABLES car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) 
              
Privatetarget 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0059 -0.0034 -0.0029 -0.00883** 
 (0.0633) (0.211) (-1.424) (-1.167) (-0.903) (-2.152) 
Cash -0.0022 0.0016 0.0000 -0.0028 0.0010 -0.0007 
 (-0.614) (0.412) (0.00665) (-0.752) (0.246) (-0.127) 
Stock 0.0092 0.0174 0.0112 0.0081 0.0162 0.0116 
 (0.389) (0.694) (0.321) (0.341) (0.643) (0.332) 
Sameindustry 0.00847* 0.00927** 0.0121*** 0.00631** 0.00723** 0.00846** 
 (1.896) (2.189) (2.708) (2.092) (2.184) (2.100) 
Serealacq -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
 (-0.0872) (-0.0819) (-0.122) (0.209) (0.186) (0.153) 
Acqgdp(t) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
 (0.156) (0.532) (0.0565) (-0.0224) (0.368) (-0.0472) 
Lnacqsize(t-1) -0.0058*** -0.0059*** -0.0063*** -0.0061*** -0.0061*** -0.0066*** 
 (-3.221) (-3.442) (-3.353) (-3.072) (-3.330) (-3.409) 
MBV(t-1) 0.0037 0.0034 0.0034 0.0036 0.0032 0.0032 
Panel A: Eurozone regressions of CARS- 2nd hypothesis 
Table 6 displays the outputs for the regressions 2a) and 2b) for the CAR(-1,+1), CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5) 
for each sample. 
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 (1.522) (1.477) (1.419) (1.503) (1.440) (1.374) 
Leverage(t-1) 0.0379** 0.0383** 0.0319 0.0389** 0.0394** 0.0320 
 (2.179) (2.228) (1.627) (2.181) (2.240) (1.621) 
Multipleshocks 0.0416 0.0366 0.0241 0.0029 -0.0014 -0.0200 
 (1.301) (1.353) (1.059) (0.389) (-0.165) (-1.472) 
multipleshocks_privatetarget -0.0459 -0.0463* -0.0376    
 (-1.491) (-1.739) (-1.501)    
multipleshocks_sameindustry    0.0266 0.0250 0.0475** 
    (0.956) (1.018) (2.001) 
Constant 0.0498 0.0431 0.0855** 0.0549 0.0482 0.0906** 
 (1.484) (1.342) (2.276) (1.550) (1.429) (2.360) 
       
Observations 1,195 1,195 1,195 1,195 1,195 1,195 
R-squared 0.110 0.116 0.108 0.102 0.107 0.111 
Acquirer Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Target Nation Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The estimations from the regression 2a) and 2b) presented in section 4 are presented in this table. The 
dependent variables are the CAR(-1,+1), CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5), all variables definition can be consulted in 
the appendix. The variables “acqgdp”, “totalassets” and “MBV” were winsoried at 1% level of each tail, in order 
to remove extreme values that could bias our results. . T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that 
the coefficient estimates are significant at 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.  
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  H2a) H2a) H2a) H2b)  H2b) H2b) 
VARIABLES car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) 
              
privatetarget -0.0064 -0.0061 -0.0132 -0.0061 -0.0056 -0.0128 
 (-1.137) (-0.924) (-1.645) (-1.093) (-0.862) (-1.610) 
cash 0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0059 0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0057 
 (0.425) (-0.335) (-0.734) (0.434) (-0.326) (-0.718) 
stock -0.0034 0.0159 0.0007 -0.0028 0.0168 0.0014 
 (-0.107) (0.378) (0.0144) (-0.0880) (0.400) (0.0288) 
sameindustry -0.0068 -0.0074 -0.0034 -0.0062 -0.0068 -0.0023 
 (-1.499) (-1.418) (-0.473) (-1.358) (-1.272) (-0.313) 
serealacq -0.0016 -0.0060 -0.0095 -0.0013 -0.0056 -0.0090 
 (-0.277) (-0.857) (-1.030) (-0.224) (-0.791) (-0.971) 
acqgdp(t) -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0043 -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0043 
 (-1.613) (-1.480) (-1.563) (-1.616) (-1.486) (-1.561) 
lnacqsize(t-1) -0.0060*** -0.0053** -0.0036 -0.0060*** -0.0054** -0.0037 
 (-2.842) (-2.202) (-1.109) (-2.855) (-2.223) (-1.126) 
MBV(t-1) -0.0012 0.0003 0.0017 -0.0012 0.0003 0.0017 
 (-0.845) (0.155) (0.834) (-0.849) (0.150) (0.827) 
leverage(t-1) 0.0211 0.0182 0.0005 0.0217 0.0190 0.0014 
 (1.155) (0.816) (0.0183) (1.184) (0.854) (0.0490) 
multipleshocks 0.0005 -0.0149 -0.0108 0.0423** 0.0457** 0.0535** 
 (0.0287) (-0.808) (-0.394) (2.530) (2.129) (2.169) 
multipleshocks_privatetarget 0.0377* 0.0571** 0.0509    
 (1.729) (2.218) (1.562)    
multipleshocks_sameindustry    -0.0178 -0.0216 -0.0401 
Panel B: UK regressions of CARS- 2nd hypothesis 
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    (-0.832) (-0.703) (-1.524) 
Constant 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.155*** 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.154*** 
 (4.288) (4.078) (3.560) (4.277) (4.066) (3.545) 
       
Observations 760 760 760 760 760 760 
R-squared 0.107 0.085 0.094 0.106 0.084 0.094 
Acquirer Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Target Nation Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
      
      
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The estimations from the regression 2a) and 2b) presented in section 4 are presented in this table. The 
dependent variables are the CAR(-1,+1), CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5), all variables definition can be consulted in 
the appendix. The variables “acqgdp”, “totalassets” and “MBV” were winsoried at 1% level of each tail, in order 
to remove extreme values that could bias our results. . T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that 
the coefficient estimates are significant at 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.  
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  H2a) H2a) H2a) H2b)  H2b) H2b) 
VARIABLES car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) car(-1,+1) car(-2,+2) car(-5,+5) 
              
privatetarget -0.0040 -0.0037 -0.0245 -0.0048 -0.0050 -0.0258 
 (-0.474) (-0.320) (-0.988) (-0.605) (-0.458) (-1.084) 
cash -0.0026 -0.0010 -0.0098 -0.0026 -0.0010 -0.0098 
 (-0.658) (-0.176) (-1.035) (-0.656) (-0.175) (-1.035) 
stock 0.0009 0.1320 -0.0016 0.0017 0.1320 -0.0001 
 (0.00819) (0.736) (-0.00537) (0.0143) (0.738) (-0.00046) 
sameindustry 0.0065 0.0004 0.0158 0.0089 0.0009 0.0211 
 (0.912) (0.0325) (0.684) (1.088) (0.0727) (0.829) 
serealacq 0.00507** 0.0052 0.0100** 0.00523** 0.0052 0.0103** 
 (1.986) (1.499) (2.097) (2.013) (1.503) (2.143) 
Acqgdp(t) -0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0037 -0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0037 
 (-0.380) (-1.094) (-1.501) (-0.396) (-1.135) (-1.508) 
lnacqsize(t-1) -0.0057** -0.0062** -0.0045 -0.0057** -0.0062** -0.0044 
 (-2.459) (-2.186) (-1.000) (-2.458) (-2.183) (-0.983) 
MBV(t-1) -0.0030 -0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0030 -0.0025 -0.0002 
 (-1.410) (-0.883) (-0.0266) (-1.417) (-0.885) (-0.0371) 
leverage(t-1) 0.0310 0.0441 0.0208 0.0312 0.0438 0.0212 
 (0.875) (0.888) (0.231) (0.879) (0.884) (0.237) 
multipleshocks -0.0023 -0.0044 0.0039 0.0007 -0.0071 0.0117 
 (-0.412) (-0.566) (0.310) (0.134) (-0.781) (0.768) 
multipleshocks_privatetarget -0.0029 -0.0055 -0.0046    
 (-0.448) (-0.677) (-0.399)    
multipleshocks_sameindustry    -0.0102 -0.0020 -0.0226 
Panel C: US regressions of CARS- 2nd hypothesis 
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    (-1.151) (-0.168) (-1.353) 
Constant 0.0781*** 0.0714*** -0.0095 0.0824*** 0.0754*** -0.0012 
 (4.914) (3.276) (-0.281) (5.170) (3.515) (-0.0360) 
       
Observations 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,112 
R-squared 0.037 0.086 0.095 0.038 0.086 0.095 
Acquirer Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Target Nation Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
       
      
      
       
Note: The estimations from the regression 2a) and 2b) presented in section 4 are presented in this table. The 
dependent variables are the CAR(-1,+1), CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5), all variables definition can be consulted in 
the appendix. The variables “acqgdp”, “totalassets” and “MBV” were winsoried at 1% level of each tail, in order 
to remove extreme values that could bias our results. . T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that 
the coefficient estimates are significant at 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.  
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6.3 Hypothesis 2a) 
 
Moving now to the hypothesis 2a), it was not found any significant coefficients for the variable 
“multipleshocks”, that has a positive impact on all the CARS for the Eurozone sample, and for the UK 
CAR(-1,+1) and the US CAR(-5,+5). 
The interaction between multipleshocks and privatetarget, variable 
“multipleshocks_privatetarget”, is only significant for Eurozone CAR(-2,+2) and UK CAR(-1,+1) and 
CAR(-2,+2), at 1% of significant level for the first two, and at 5% for the last one. On average, a deal 
that involves a private target when there were at least two currency shocks in the last four quarters, 
has a negative impact of 4.63 percentage points for the Eurozone CAR(-2,+2) and a positive impact of 
3.77 and 5.71 percentage points for the UK CAR(-1,+1) and CAR(-2,+2), ceteris paribus. The remaining 
insignificant coefficients for the CARS are negative, except for the UK CAR(-5,+5), which means that 
this variable is always positive for our CARs in the UK sample. 
Due to the lack of significant values this hypothesis cannot be confirmed. 
 
6.4 Hypothesis 2b)  
 
Finally, in our last hypothesis 2b), we can observe that the variable “multipleshocks”, is only 
significant for the UK CARs, significant at 5% level. When there were at least 2 currency shocks in the 
4 quarters before the deal, on average, there is a positive impact of 4.23,4.57 and 5.35 percentage 
points, for the UK CAR(-1,+1), CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5), respectively, ceteris paribus. 
At last, the interaction between multipleshocks and sameindustry, variable 
“multipleshocks_sameindustry”, is only significant for the Eurozone CAR(-5,+5) at a 5% level of 
significance. The coefficient of 0.0475 means that, on average, when there were at least 2 currency 
shocks in the 4 quarters before the deal that involves an acquirer and a target that play in the same 
industry, there is, on average, a positive impact of 4.75 percentage points on the Eurozone CAR(-5,+5), 
 
47 
 
ceteris paribus. The remaining insignificant “multipleshocks_sameindustry” have a positive impact for 
the Eurozone CARs and a negative impact for all the UK and the US CARs. 
As there are no significant UK CARs for the variable “multipleshocks_sameindustry” we cannot 
confirm that the positive effects on bidder’s CARS for the UK displayed in the variable “multipleshocks” 
are enlarged. Then, I am not able to confirm this hypothesis. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
 I have examined the value creation of currency effects on bidder’s cumulative abnormal returns 
for different event windows, resulted from cross-border M&As announcements. 
 In this analysis the main problem is related to the lack of currency shocks that were found for 
a reference level of 25% and 15%, which made me to use a value of 10% to have currency shocks for 
almost all the targets, because without shocks this analysis would be worthless. To face this problem, 
I thought about including a variable to identify multiple shocks, because if there were many 
continuously devaluations of a given target currency, that could make the currency matter be more 
relevant. 
 In this analysis was quite difficult to identify significant variables of interest, maybe this could 
be explained the post-effects of the financial crisis. Still, I found a few significant variables related to 
currency depreciations. 
 For our hypothesis 1a) I found a positive impact of the variable “aftershock” on the CAR(-2,+2) 
for the Eurozone. However, still in the same hypothesis the variable “aftershock_private” target has a 
negative impact on CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5), which was not expected and goes against the findings 
of Draper and Paudyal (2006). Regarding hypothesis 1b) it was found once more one significant 
coefficient for the variable “aftershock” related to CAR(-1,+1) from Eurozone, and a significant negative 
coefficient for “aftershock_sameindustry” linked to the CAR(-1,+1) and CAR(-5,+5) from the USA, 
which is not expected by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991). Overall for the first hypothesis the significant 
coefficients indicate a positive impact of the variable “aftershock” on the bidder’s CAR  
 In the hypothesis 2a) I found no significant coefficients for “multipleshocks”. However the 
relation between the variables “multipleshocks” and “privatetarget”, counts on a negative coefficient 
for the CAR(--2,+2) from Eurozone and two significant and positive coefficients for CAR(-1,+1) and 
CAR(-2,+2) from the UK bidders, which is expected based on Harris and Ravenscraft (1991). 
 The last hypothesis 2b) reveals that all the variables “multipleshocks” from the UK have 
significant coefficients that indicate positive effects of “multipleshocks” on all the CARS used in this 
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analysis as dependent variable. Regarding the variable “multipleshocks_sameindustry” I found a 
significant and positive coefficient for the Eurozone CAR(-5,+5). 
 Overall the few significant coefficients of the variables “aftershock” and “multipleshocks” – 
isolated variables related to currency depreciations, indicate higher CARS when there are effects of 
currency depreciation, which is expected based on a studies led by (Blonigen, 1997; Froot & Stein, 
1991; Goldberg & Koistad, 1994). The interactions between these variables with target status and 
acquirer and target’s industries are not conclusive, since I did not find the same coefficients signs for 
those variables. This inconclusive link between currency effects and industry/private status may serve 
as an incentive to future researches. 
 Finally, it was used several control variables based on literature, and the variables more 
significant are “acqsize” and “sameindustry” (from the Eurozone sample). The first has a negative 
impact on CARs, which meets with the results of Moeller et al. (2004), who say that usually bigger 
bidders are associated with the term management hubris, destroying value.   The second variable has  
positive coefficients as expected by a study led by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991). 
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Appendix 
 
Variable  Meaning 
 
𝑐𝑎𝑟(𝜏1, 𝜏2)  
 
Dependent variable, cumulative abnormal return for a given event 
window, that is computed for each deal 
Source: Datastream 
 
Privatetarget Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the target is private 
Source: SDC Platinum 
 
Cash  Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the deal payment is made 
exclusively in cash 
Source: SDC Platinum 
 
Stock Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the deal payment is made 
exclusively in stock 
Source: SDC Platinum 
 
Sameindustry Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if acquirer and target operate 
in the same industry, which is classified by the 2-digit SIC-codes 
Source: SDC Platinum 
 
Serialacq Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if over the all sample the 
bidder acquires more than five times 
Source: SDC Platinum  
Acqgdp(t) 
 
GDP growth rate of the acquirer’s nation in the year of the deal 
Source: Datastream 
 
Lnacqsize(t-1) Logarithmic variable of the acquirer’s total assets, one year before 
the deal 
Source: Datastream 
 
MBV(t-1)  
 
Acquirer’s  market-to-book value, one year before the deal, in the 
acquirer’s currency 
 Source: Datastream 
 
Leverage(t-1) Ratio of Total Liabilities/Total Assets, one year before the deal, in 
the acquirer’s currency  
Source: Datastream 
 
Aftershock Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in the four quarters after the 
currency shock 
 
 
Source: Datastream 
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Aftershock_privatetarget Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for private targets four 
quarters after a currency shock 
´ 
 
Aftershock_sameindustry 
Source: Datastream/SDC Platinum 
 
Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for acquirers and targets that 
play in the same industry (classified by the 2-digit SIC-codes) four 
quarters after a currency shock 
Source: Datastream/SDC Platinum  
Multipleshocks Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if in the last four quarters 
there were at least two currency shocks 
Source: Datastream 
 
Multipleshocks_private target Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for private targets if in the 
last four quarters there were at least two currency shocks 
Source: Datastream/SDC Platinum 
 
Multipleshocks_sameindustry Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for acquirers and targets that 
play in the same industry (classified by the 2-digit SIC-codes) if 
there were at least 2 currency shocks in the last 4 quarters 
 
 
Acqindustry 
Source: Datastream/SDC Platinum 
 
Dummies for acquirer industries (classified by the 2-digit SIC-
codes) 
Source: SDC Platinum 
 
Targetnation Dummies for the target’s Nation 
 
 
 
Source: SDC Platinum 
 
 
 
